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Abstract 
Competition  law  seeks  to  foster  competition  and  innovation  through  the  sanctioning  of 
antitrust behavior, and it especially seeks to discourage the creation of hardcore cartels. To that 
effect, the European Union imposes administrative sanctions to cartels, whereas the United States use 
their  penal  system  against  them.  This  paper  will  analyze  the  advantages  and  limitations  of  each 
option, and will determine whether it would be more effective for the European Union to also use its 
penal system against cartels. 
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1. Introduction 
Effective  competition  benefits  consumers  as  it  fosters  lower  prices,  higher  quality 
products, a wider selection of goods and services, and innovation. In order to ensure a more  
effective  competition,  diverse  enforcement  systems  have  been  implemented  seeking  to 
achieve three main objectives: punishment of antitrust behavior, prevention of recidivism, and 
general deterrence. There are various ways in which these three objectives can be achieved, 
and thus it is of particular importance to analyze the approach different jurisdictions choose 
when confronted with antitrust offences, and more specifically hardcore cartels, in order to 
establish the benefits and limitations of each approach.  
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are two major jurisdictions in 
the sense of (i) having the nominal authority and enforcement capability to compel fidelity to 
their demands, and (ii) being the most fully developed. Therefore, this empirical study will 
compare  the  approach  of  the  European  Union  to  hardcore  cartels,  which  is  based  on 
administrative  sanctions,  with  the  system  used  by  the  United  States,  which  is  based  on 
criminal prosecution. This study will then analyze the differences and, based on the results of 
this analysis, it will endeavor to determine whether the EU antitrust sanctioning system could 
be improved by adopting approaches more similar to those of the US. 
With this aim, first, a contextualization is needed in order to define where we are and 
expose in a comprehensive manner the most important features of each system. Next, the 
functioning of the EU system will be addressed through an explanation of the manner in 
which  the  European  Commission  calculates  fines,  followed  by  a  short  exposition  on  the 
criticism it has faced. In addition, the  positive and negative aspects of the measures used by 
the US antitrust system will be described and analyzed, with a specific focus on criminal 
penalties. Finally, a decision will be made regarding the convenience for the EU of adopting a 
penal approach to antitrust behaviors, detailing whether it would be an improvement of the 
EU antitrust sanctioning system. 
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2. Contextualization 
Competition arises when firms fight for customers by offering them a better deal in 
terms of price, quality, range, reliability and associated services. In this spirit, in Europe, the 
European  Commission  (EC)  stated  that  the  objective  of  article  101  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is to protect competition in the market as a means 
to enhance consumer welfare
565. 
There are three components of consumer welfare: money –reduction of prices or price 
maintenance whereas the quality is enhanced–, consumer choice, and innovation. All three 
elements should be protected since any of them could be endangered by collusive agreements 
or abuse of a dominant position
566. Cartels are the main example of collusive agreements, and 
they  generally  involve  price -fixing,  market  division,  control  of  output,  mitigation  of 
technological  improvement  and  limitation  of  production.  Therefore,  they  are  especially 
targeted by antitrust regulations. 
These regulations establish that the punishment for antitrust behavior  should deter 
future  infringements  of  competition  law  through  the  creation  of  a  credible  threat  of 
prosecution and punishment, without leading firms to choose an excessive (and therefore 
costly) level of compliance. There is a broad consent on what should be regarded as a n 
optimal fine: first, it must exceed the social cost of the crime and, secondly, complete 
deterrence is not desirable
567; thus, the expected fine will equal the harm of the violation  so 
that the value of the illegal behavior is expected to be zero
568; in other words, the minimal 
optimal fine is equal to the expected illicit gain derived from the collusion
569.  POSNER 
explains  this  situation  by  stating  that  "the  penalty  for  an  antitrust  violation  should  be 
calculated to impose on the violator a cost, whether in pecuniary or non-pecuniary terms, 
equal to the cost that his violation imposed on society. This criterion is not derived from 
notions of symmetry or from the biblical notion of an eye for an eye. It is a criterion of 
efficiency."
570 
3. The European Union: an administrative system 
The procedure followed by the Commission  has  to  respect  three important  points: 
treaty’s competition law provisions cannot be enforced criminally, private litigants cannot file 
cases before the Commission -the process is strictly civil and administrative- and, finally, the 
essential coercive power is to order fines. Europe’s approach, different from other systems has 
long been administrative rather than judicial in nature
571. 
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The process of calculating the fines in the EU is set out in the 2006 Guidelines on the 
method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (“2006 
Guidelines”). As stated in Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, even if these guidelines 
"may not be regarded as rules of law which [the Commission] is always bound to observe, 
they nevertheless form rules of practice from which [the Commission] may not depart in an 
individual  case  without  giving  reasons  that  are  compatible  with  the  principle  of  equal 
treatment"
572. This process, as explained  below, is divided into two basic steps, after which 
possible benefits –such as immunity from leniency programmes– will be applicable. 
A. Process of calculating the fines 
When establishing the amount of the fine, in order to ensure that the fines are set at a 
level sufficient to deter anticompetitive behaviors, the Commission “will have regard to all 
relevant circumstances and particularly the gravity and duration of the infringement, which 
are the two criteria explicitly referred to in Article 23(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003”
573. 
Apart from that, the Commission will also take into account any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances  for  each  undertaking.  Additionally,  it  will  apply,  where  appropriate,  the 
Leniency  Notice
574. Finally, the Commission will refer  to the principles laid down in its 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23.2.a of Regulation No 
1/2003
575.  The  importance  of  these  Guidelines  lies  in  that  they  contain  a  two -step 
methodology to set fines by the Commission. 
a. First step 
The 2006 Guidelines on fines and settle case law establish that “the basic amounts for 
each  party  result  from  the  addition  of  a  variable  amount  and  an  additional  amount.  The 
variable amount results from a percentage of up to 30% of the value of sales of goods or 
services to which the infringement relates in a given year (normally, the last full business year 
of the infringement) multiplied by the number of years of the undertaking’s participation in 
the infringement. The additional amount (“entry fee”) is calculated as a percentage between 
15% and 25% of the value of sales. The resulting basic amount can then be increased or 
reduced for each company if either aggravating or mitigating circumstances are retained”
576. 
In other words, the basic amount of the fine will be determined as a proportion of the value of 
the sales, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of 
years of infringement
577. 
Graphically, the first step could be shortened with the following formula: BA = VA + EF 
= (VS ￗ P ￗ Y) + EF 
Where: 
-  BA = Basic Amount 
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-  VA  =  Variable  amount  before  taxes,  which  at  the  same  time  is  the  sum  of  three 
components: 
-  VS = Value of sales: direct and indirect in the EEA related to the infringement 
of the last full business year of participation in the infringement (unless the 
figure is not representative). 
-  P = Percentage related to the gravity of the offence: it can range from 0-30% 
and  is  determined  by:  the  nature  of  infringement,  its  geographic  scope, 
implementation of the agreement, and the combined market share of the parties 
in the relevant market. For hard-core cartels the percentage will generally be 
set at the higher end of the scale  
-  Y = Number of years the undertaking participated in the agreement. 
-  EF = Entry fee: it is a percentage of 15% to 25% of the value of shares, which is 
always  imposed  on  hard-core  cartel  participants  and  might  be  imposed  on  other 
infringers, too. It will depend, among others, on the nature of the infringement, its 
geographic  scope,  the  implementation,  the  parties’  combined  market  shares  in  the 
relevant market…  
 
Firstly, the economic importance of a specific business is translated in the value of 
sales
578. According to the Commission “the relative strength of each undertaking concerned is 
determined  as  the  percentage  for  which  its  sales  of  the  goods  or  services  to  which  the 
infringement relates in the geographic area covered by the cartel account in relation to the 
aggregate sales in that area of all of the undertakings concerned”
579. 
Secondly,  according  to  the  Commission’s  practice,  the  percentage  related  to  the 
gravity of the offence is generally established between 15% and 25% because in accordance 
with point 23 of the 2006 Guidelines, if we are referring to secret horizontal price-fixing and 
market-sharing agreements, the rate should be no lower than 15%
580.  
Thirdly, in order to take fully into account the duration of the participation of each 
undertaking in the infringement individually, the amount determined on the basis of the value 
of sales will be multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement
581. If a 
fine  has  to  be  imposed  on  several  companies  that  belong  to  the  same  undertaking,  “the 
duration of the infringement should be calculated on the basis of the economic power of that 
undertaking during the last full year of its participation in the infringement”
582, in order to 
ensure it has sufficient deterrent effect. Nevertheless, as the General Court has acknowledged 
“it is not necessary to establish in practical terms a direct relation between that duration and 
increased damage to the European Union objectives pursued by the competition rules”
583. 
Finally, about the entry fee, point 25 of the 2006 Guidelines on fines and settle case 
law  states  that  “irrespective  of  the  duration  of  the  undertaking’s  participation  in  the 
infringement, the basic amount will include a sum of between 15% and 25% of the value of 
sales”
584. This percentage is totally independent of the aforementioned entry fee. 
The aim of imposing this amount is to deter undertakings from even entering into such 
illegal practices, especially in the case of firms with a high turnover or when there are big 
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disparities  between  the  size  of  the  undertaking  participating  in  the  infringement  because 
although other factors are also taken into account, “the link between, first, undertakings’ size 
and global resources and, second, the need to ensure that a fine has deterrent effect cannot be 
denied”
585. 
b. Second step 
The Commission will use this second step to adjust the fine taking into account the 
particular circumstances of the case. This second step can also be shortened with a formula, 
which is the following: BA ￗ AF = fine ≤ 0.1 ￗ total turnover. 
-  BA = Basic Amount 
-  AF = Adjusting factors 
-  0.1 = 10% ceiling cap 
 
First  of  all,  the  10%  ceiling  cap,  according  to  article  23.2  of  Regulation  1/2003, 
implies that the fine imposed on each undertaking must not exceed 10% of its total turnover in 
the preceding business  year, independently of the cooperation of the undertaking
586. This 
percentage is only applied to the final amount of the fine, and not to the intermediate amounts 
which can exceed this limit
587. Therefore, the maximum amount of the fine that can be 
imposed on a given undertaking can be determined in advance
588. The Commission has 
capped the fine in very few cases. Examples of such cases include Refrigeration Compressors 
to  ACC;  in  Animal  Fee  Phosphates  to  Tessenderlo  Chemie  N.V.,  Yara  Suomi  Oy,  Yara 
Phosphates Oy and Quimit￩cnica.com – Com￩rcio e Indústria Química S.A, and to two of the 
undertakings participating in the Bathroom fittings and fixtures case
589 
Secondly, adjusting factors can be related or unrelated to the infringement. The former 
are  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances,  which  can  be  organized  as  shown  in  the 
following non-exhaustive table in Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors on the imposition of 
EC fines 
Aggravating factors  Mitigating factors 
Ringleader or instigator. 
 
Limited involvement and non-
implementation of the infringement. 
                                                 
585 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), C-413/08 P  "Lafarge SA v European Commission", 17 June 2010, par. 102.; 
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber), T-112/07 "Hitachi Ltd, Hitachi Europe Ltd and Japan AE Power Systems 
Corp. v European Commission", 12 July 2011, pars. 349-350. 
586 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) , T-304/02 "Hoek Loos NV v Commission of the European 
Communities" 4 July 2006, par. 123. 
587 Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber), T-377/06 "Comap SA v European Commission" 24 March 2011, par. 
111; Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), T-11/06, "Romana Tabacchi Srl v European Commission", 5 October 
2011, par. 259; Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Cha mber), Joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03,. "F￩d￩ration 
nationale de la coop￩ration b￩tail et viande (FNCBV) and F￩d￩ration nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) 
and Others v Commission of the European Communities.", 13 December 2006, par. 255. 
588 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), C-413/08  "Lafarge SA v European Commission", 17 June 2010, par. 95. 
589 Decision of the European Commission, COMP/39600  "Refrigeration compressors", 7 December 2011, par. 88; Decision 
of the European Commission , COMP/38866 "Animal Feed Phosphates", 20 July 2010, par. 214; Decision of the European 
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Refusal to cooperate (it can also lead to the 
imposition of separate fines for procedural 
infringements, but not to both a procedural fine 
and an aggravating circumstance). 
Cooperation with the Commission (except 
for leniency applications requirements). 
Coercion or retaliatory measures.  Pressure exercised by other 
companies. 
Infringement continues after the Commission’s 
investigation. 
Immediate termination of the infringement, 
as soon as the 
Commission intervenes. 
Awareness of the illegal nature of the conduct.  Negligence. 
Recidivism (the fine can be increased by 
100%, for each past infringement, also NCA 
condemning decisions count; no period of 
limitation). 
Introduction of a compliance policy. 
Institutionalized nature of the infringement.  -- 
Significance of the industry influenced.  -- 
--  Public authorization/ encouragement. 
-- 
 
Slow reaction/ excessive length of 
procedures. 
Source: Geradin, Damien, "The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment." 2011-052, p. 8 
All of the factors mentioned in the Figure have been or could have been taken into 
consideration by the Commission to increase or decrease the basic amount
590. For example, 
“the instigator” aggravating circumstance was used in Bitumen to increase the fine imposed to 
Shell  by  50%
591.  On  the  other  hand,  as  an  example  of  a  mitigating  circumstance,  in 
Prestressing  steel  the  Commission  considered  that  the  role  of  Proderac  and  Trame  was 
substantially  more  limited  than  that  of  the  other  cartel  participants  and  granted  them  a 
reduction of 5% of the fine
592. 
Adjusting factors unrelated to the infringement are: (1) the increase for deterrence, in 
order to ensure that it exceeds the amount of gains improperly made as a result of the 
infringement; (2) the 10% ceiling cap; and (3) the inability to pay defense, when there is “(i) a 
specific social and  economic context” and “(ii) paying would irretrievably jeopardize the 
economic viability of the undertaking and cause its assets to lose all their value”
593. 
c. Leniency programs 
When firms decide to collude, it is highly likely that they will continue to collude 
indefinitely  as  long  as  the  initial  factors  that  allowed  the  expected  gains  to  exceed  the 
expected  losses  do  not  change.  There  are  essentially  three  ways  in  which  competition 
authorities can obtain information from the companies and individuals that have committed 
                                                 
590 What is clear is that the word “other” that appears in point 28 of the 2006 Guidelines (when referring to aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances) highlights the discretion that the Commission has bestowed upon itself.  Damien  Geradin and 
David  Henry,  "The  EC  Fining  Policy  for  Violations  of  Competition  Law:  An  Empirical  Review  of  the  Commission 
Decisional Practice and the Community Courts’ Judgments," 02/05 (February 2005): 13.  
591 Decision of the European Commission, COMP / 38.456 "Bitumen", 3 october 2007, pars. 342, 349. 
592 Decision of the European Commission, COMP/38344 "Prestressing steel", 19 november 2011, par. 994, 1026. 
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the antitrust violations: direct force (for example, inspections or “dawn-raids”), compulsion 
(for instance, threatened sanctions for refusal to cooperate) and leniency. 
This third method deserves special focus because it presents clear advantages: firstly, 
it can be used to obtain all kind of information –not just existing documents or other existing 
physical evidence, as it happens in case of resorting to direct force–; secondly, it saves on 
search costs because it is done by the undertaking and its employees, and thirdly, there is no 
risk of applicants providing unreliable information, as is the case with compulsion, in which  
untruthful  self-indicting  statements  are  sometimes  made  in  order  to  escape  from  the 
pressure
594. 
According  to  this  program,  only  one  undertaking  will  benefit  from  a  complete 
immunity  of  fines;  namely,  the  first  undertaking  applying  for  leniency  that  submits 
information and evidence which, in the Commission’s view, will enable it either to carry out a 
targeted inspection in connection with the alleged cartel or to find an infringement of Article 
101  TFEU.  Companies  which,  despite  their  willingness  to  cooperate,  file  their  leniency 
application after another competitor has qualified  for immunity, can only hope to obtain a 
reduction  of  up  to  50%  of  any  fine  imposed  on  them,  and  this  reduction  declines  for 
subsequent firms to a maximum of 20%
595. The incentive of benefitting from immunity for 
being the first to self-report is supposed to induce undertakings to come forward, over all, 
when the probability of the rest of the team members being convicted with high fines had 
increased. 
B. Main problems 
The Commission’s practice has some problems that should be addressed if we want to 
improve the deterrent effect of sanctions
596.. In this section we are going to deal with some of 
the most important ones. 
a. Uncertainty and lack of transparency 
The EU fining system involves a certain level of uncertainty because it is impossible 
to predict the amount of the fine that will be imposed.. This problem has not been solved even 
after the 2006 Guidelines
597. In 2005,  KILLICK stated that “even the best-informed lawyer 
would struggle to give any more than an approximate range, which could turn out to be half or 
double the fine ultimately imposed”
598. GERADIN, to sustain this criticism, uses the example of 
the 2010 DG Competition Stakeholder Study where “the majority of lawyers and half the 
companies participating in the survey submitted that, with the possible range of fine levels 
now available in the 2006 Guidelines, fines became even more difficult to predict”
599.  
                                                 
594 Wils, Wouter P.J., "The European Commission's 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines: A Legal and Economic Analysis," 
30-2 (June 2007): 21. 
595  European Commission, "Compliance Matters. what Companies can do Better to Respect EU Competition Rules," 
(November 2011): 18.  
596 Wehmh￶rner, Nonthika. "Optimal fining policies" (2005): 8 
597 As Weber observes “Even some per se violations of the rule are beyond the reach of any meaningful punishment. It is not 
that antitrust damages are necessarily too high or too low, it is that they vary dramatically and that there is no a priori way to 
predict where punishment in a particular case or for a particular defendant will come out. This is the real but overlooked 
incoherence of antitrust punishment” Spencer Weber Waller, "The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust," 78 (2003): 208.  
598 Killick, James, "Is it Now Time for a Single Europe -Wide Fining Policy? an Analysis of t he Fining Policies of the 
Commission and the Member States," 7 (December 2005): 1.  
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Criticism  was  leveled,  for  example,  at  the  wording  of  paragraph  37  of  the  2006 
Guidelines where it is stated that “in view of the particularities of a given case or in view of 
the need to achieve deterrence for a specific undertaking, the Commission might be justified 
to depart from these Guidelines”. Due to the “lack of clarity” of what this exactly involve, or 
more precisely, what the legislator mean by “particularities of the case” and “deterrence”; it 
might be said that this uncertainty conflicts with the principle of legality and the protection of 
the  undertakings’  legitimate  expectations,  Article  7  ECHR,  which  reads  that  legislation 
should be “unequivocal and its application must be predictable for those subject to it.”
600. 
b. Absence of individual sanctions 
EU competition law only foresees fines to undertakings. However, natural persons –
which can be employees or employers– are the ones naturally engaged in the anticompetitive 
behaviors. This notwithstanding, it is true that an undertaking might have limited resources to 
discipline its employees and that they might have left the undertaking by the time the fine is 
imposed
601. It is also true t hat once the offence has been committed, it may be difficult to 
impose sanctions because, for example, as the individuals are not identified in Commission 
decisions, proving employees’ liability in front of labor courts will not be an easy task
602. 
However, according to WILS “it is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer 
in proportion to his wrongdoing”
603. 
Besides, in a study carried out by HOJ et al it is clearly stated that “applying sanctions 
to individuals would increase deterrence”
604 which is in line with the results from the survey 
carried out by Deloitte (2007) in the UK, which shows that sanctions which directly affect 
individuals (such as criminal penalties and director disqualification) are believed to have a 
greater impact on deterring infringements than sanctions which are imposed on businesses
605. 
Furthermore, the moral force of antitrust laws is dramatically reduced by “not holding an 
individual responsible for his unlawful actions”
606. 
c. Recidivism 
In its 2006 Fining Guidelines, the European Commission defines recidivism as the 
situation "where an undertaking continues or repeats the same or a similar infringement after 
the Commission or a national competition authority has made a finding that the undertaking 
infringed [now Articles 101 or 102 TFEU]”. And, according to the EU General Court, it 
implies "that a person has committed fresh infringements after having been penalized for 
similar infringements"
607. 
However,  although  recidivism  will  produced  an  increase  on  the  sanctions,  as 
GINSBURG and WRIGHT suggest, “current sanctions have no more than a transitory impact 
upon market outcomes and little, if any, deterrent value”
608, or at least that is the only possible 
explanation to the high number of firms that are found to be recidivist. In fact, an study carry 
                                                 
600 Geradin, Damien, "The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment," 2011-052 (October 2011): 18-33. 
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out  by  GOLUB,  DETRE,  and  CONNOR  shows  that  harsher  antitrust  penalties  for  infringing 
individuals  and  firms  have  no  effect  on  the  rate  of  recidivism;  or,  if  they  have,  it  is 
unobservable  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  compensated  by  the  positive  effect  of  antitrust 
compliance programs
609. 
There is empirical evidence that shows that, for the last two decades, there has been a 
significant degree of continued cartel formation, as well as multiple convictions of scores of 
firms for price fixing. However, worldwide data shows that recidivism runs rampant among 
those convicted. (See Figure 2)
610. Therefore, antitrust authorities must strive to improve 
existing regulations or to new ways of maximizing deterrence. 
Figure 2: The World’s leading recidivist (1990-2009) 
 
Company 
 
Number of judgments worldwide 
1990-2009 
BASF  26 
Total S.A. (TotalFina, Elf, Atofina)  18 
F. Hoffman-La Roche  17 
Azko Nobel  14 
Aventis  14 
ENI  14 
Shell  14 
Degussa (Evonik)  13 
Bayer  11 
Mitsubishi  10 
Mitsui  10 
Source: Ginsburg, Douglas H. and. Wright, Joshua D., "Antitrust Sanctions." P. 15 
4. The United States: a criminal system 
Antitrust enforcement in the United States is a mixture of public and private efforts
611. 
Regarding public enforcement, a violation of antitrust laws c an result in a wide range of 
criminal sanctions, which vary from corporate fines and restitution payments to prison, 
including house arrest and fines for the corporate officials involved
612. Injunctions or cease-
and-desist orders are rarely used against nake d cartels, as are measures for structural relief 
such as mandatory divestitures or restructuring of governance structures
613.  
There is no doubt that the most common sanctions used by the US Government are 
corporate fines, individual fines and imprisonment of responsible managers. The analysis of 
the US antitrust sanctioning system is especially interesting, at least when it comes to criminal 
penalties, because, apart from Israel and Japan, it is the only jurisdiction that has served 
                                                 
609 Golub, Alla; Detre, Joshua and Connor, John M.,  "The Profitability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions 
Deterred?" (April 2005): 11. 
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prison sentences to a significative number of price-fixers with a well-established record of 
sending price-fixers to prison
614. More precisely, the Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that 
“[…]  on  conviction  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  fine  not  exceeding  $100,000,000  if  a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court”
615. 
The  main  difference  between  the  US  approach  and  that  of  the  EU  having  been 
described, an analysis will be carried out, in order to detail the benefits and negative aspects 
of criminal sanctions, more specifically imprisonment, in maximizing deterrence of antitrust 
behavior. The goal is to determine whether European legislation would increase deterrence 
and solve some of the problems of its current regulatory system, and especially recidivism, 
were it to adopt some of the US approaches to the issue. 
A. Main advantages in relation to the weaknesses of the EU system 
Firstly,  sanctions  are  correctly  targeted:  penalties  directed  against  the  individuals 
involved in the infringements might well a greater deterrence effect than penalties directed 
against  the  corporations.  As  previously  established,  the  ability  of  a  firm  to  discipline  its 
employees is rather limited, as employees may have left the firm before the infraction is 
discovered. Furthermore, reliance on corporate sanctions alone may incentivize lower internal 
corporate enforcement efforts
616. 
Secondly, individual sanctions, and especially imprisonment, provide with  stronger 
incentives to apply for leniency if set appropriately
617. Presently, it could be said that fines 
imposed by the European Commission are often perceived as a “license fee” paid to access 
larger (unlawful) cartel profits, whereas in the US individuals who are ultimately responsible 
for the active implementation of a cartel scheme are held accountable before the authorities 
for the offence receiving a punishment that fits their conduct
618. 
Thirdly, hefty fines may cause the undertaking to go bankrupt beca use most firms 
would not have sufficient liquid assets to cover a fine capable of achieving the desired level of 
deterrence
619. The long-term impact of a fine will vary greatly depending on the firm, 
reflecting differences in capital structure and other factors affecting the firm's ability to adjust 
to the payment of the fine, as it is likely that the profits would have been paid out in taxes, 
dividends, salaries and wages
620. 
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Finally, custodial sentences have a social and professional stigmatization effect that 
might act as a deterrent; however, custodial sentences incur a cost on society and it is said that 
every prison term has a corresponding fine equally deterring
621. 
B. Main problems of criminal penalties  
The first problem relates to jurisdiction because antitrust enforcement is essentially 
territorial in nature, so criminal sanctions might not deter international and global cartels. 
When sanctions rely basically on prison sentences, it is more difficult to persuade managers of 
cartels who reside abroad to submit to US jurisdiction
622. This is important because even if the 
criminalization  is  perceived  as  a  proportionate  response  it  must  lead  to  convictions. 
Otherwise, there would be a gap between general public’s expectations and the deliveries 
from the courts which will affect to the normative commitment
623. 
Secondly, as a consequence of criminal sanctions, cartelists will be more determined 
to try to avoid detection and more sophisticated in their methods. As a consequence, it will 
become more difficult to detect and prosecute them. At the same time, the criminalization of 
cartels raises the standard of proof required
624. It is more complicated to discharge the burden 
of proof without the active help of cartel members; that is, without admissions and without the 
agreement of the companies. If criminal proceedings are implemented, there must be an 
increase in the rights of defense which would render criminal cases more difficult to win than 
civil or administrative proceedings. As a result, deterrence, rather than inc reasing, will be 
diminishing because of the additional hurdles for prosecutors
625. 
Thirdly,  judges  might  be  reluctant  to  impose  prison  sentences.  As  one  former 
Department of Justice official observed, “federal judges were reluctant to sentence price fixers 
to jail and tended to attempt to come up with alternative ‘public service’ type sentences” 
because “antitrust price fixers were often pillars of the community, supporters of charity, and 
posed no physical danger to other members of society.”
626 
Lastly, we have to consider the existence of options less aggressive than imprisonment 
because  there  are  other  measures  that  might  discourage  the  employee  from  committing 
antitrust violations, while at the same time emphasizing that cartelizing is a serious wrong that 
ought to have adverse consequences for the wrongdoers –and not just for the companies
627. 
Examples of these options are: 
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a.  Disqualification
628:  this  type  of  sanctions  may  dissuade  executives  from 
engaging in cartelistic behavior without any cost for society. It g oes directly 
against  the  individual  who  has  committed  the  infringement  but  is  less 
aggressive than imprisonment. Therefore, it could be a solution for systems 
that  do  not  want  to  resort  to  prison  sentences.  The  deterrent  effect  of 
disqualification  stems  ma inly  from  its  tendency  to  deny  the  offender  a 
substantial part of their income. It must be taken into account that the CEOs 
who are fined or imprisoned for global price fixing by the US DOJ are often at 
or near the top of their corporate management structures
629. 
b.  Internal  audits  and  compliance  programs:  they  rely  on  the  education  of 
employees  with  no  background  in  competition  law  so  that  they  learn  what 
forms of contact with competitors are legal and which are prohibited. 
c.  Use of private enforcement: this would increase the final amount of the fine. 
However, the threat of civil damages could create an additional incentive to 
keep prices  elevated once a  cartel  has  been detected since price  reductions 
could be used as evidence of the damages inflicted by the cartel.  
d.  Rewards for whistleblowing: these rewards may be an inexpensive means of 
improving the success of leniency programs because they could be financed 
cheaply from fines imposed on other cartel members. Nevertheless, it should 
be born in mind that a bounty could incentivize employees to over-report.  
e.  Reputational  mechanisms:  undertakings,  to  some  extent,  trade  on  their 
reputation. Therefore, if antitrust enforcement becomes a general value of the 
society, an illicit behavior may foreclose profitable opportunities in the future. 
5. Conclusions 
Refinement of antitrust laws requires experimentation and observation of the results. 
Indeed, banning cartel activity is merely symbolic if the ban is not reinforced with serious 
sanctions;  for  that  reason,  there  is  no  doubt  for  competition  authorities  that,  regarding 
offences like price fixing, substantial sanctions are crucial to deter, more so if we take into 
account the probability of detection..  
Imprisonment might be regarded as the ideal option since it increases the value of the 
sanctions and it could be also regarded as an alternative to avoid problems caused by the 
imposition of high fines –i.e., bankruptcy–. However, we have to bear in mind that it shows 
several important drawbacks, the main one being the reluctance of judges to impose prison 
sentences.  
Thus, the application of penal sanctions to antitrust offences would, in the current 
climate in the EU, create more issues than it would solve. Furthermore, criminal sanctions 
must always be used as ultima ratio. Therefore, the author propounds that the EU should 
strive to improve preexisting approaches before resorting to new ones, yet untested in the EU. 
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